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No Exit 
Yemen's Existential Crisis 
by Sheila Carapico | published May 3, 2011 
A venal dictatorship three decades old, mutinous army officers, dissident tribal sheikhs, a 
parliamentary opposition coalition, youthful pro-democracy activists, gray-haired Socialists, 
gun-toting cowboys, veiled women protesters, northern carpetbaggers, Shi‘i insurgents, tear 
gas canisters, leaked State Department cables, foreign-born jihadis -- Yemen’s demi-
revolutionary spring has it all. The mass uprising in southern Arabia blends features of the 
peaceful popular revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia with elements of the state repression in 
Libya and Syria in a gaudy, fast-paced, multi-layered theater of revolt verging on the 
absurd. 
Whether the drama will end in glory or tragedy remains to be seen. But indications are not 
promising. Already, President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih has stalled and contrived to avoid signing a 
late April deal brokered by Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) neighbors desperate to restore a 
semblance of stability in the most populous corner of the Arabian Peninsula. The GCC 
extracted a verbal promise from Salih to resign the presidency after a period of 30 days. But 
convincing him to make good on his pledge under conditions satisfactory to Yemeni elites, 
the pro-democracy movement and interested foreign parties is a gargantuan task, requiring 
more diplomatic legerdemain than has been brought to bear so far. On April 30, instead of 
signing onto the proposed agreement, Salih sent tanks firing live ammunition to clear some 
1,500 campers from a central square in the Mansoura district of the southern port city of 
Aden. ‘Abd al-Latif al-Zayani, secretary-general of the six-nation GCC, who had flown to the 
Yemeni capital of Sanaa to meet with Salih, returned to Saudi Arabia red-faced and empty-
handed. 
Under the Bush and particularly the Obama administrations, the United States has been 
deeply implicated in Yemen, which emerged in the late 2000s as a haven and launching pad 
for the Arabian Peninsula branch of al-Qaeda. Especially since the Christmas 2009 “crotch 
bomber” attempted to detonate an explosive device hidden in his underwear on an airplane 
in Detroit, the US has spent up to $300 million upgrading counter-terrorism, military and 
internal security forces loyal to Salih. The Pentagon provided helicopters, armored vehicles, 
ammunition, surveillance technology, Humvees, night-vision goggles and other military 
equipment, as well as training, to its Yemeni counterparts. Classified cables released by 
WikiLeaks show that this assistance increased despite the Salih regime’s widely recognized 
backsliding from democratization and toward repression, as well as plentiful red flags in 
2009 and 2010 that American-made weapons were being used against domestic enemies. 
Gulf and French officials were also frank with the State Department in their assessments of 
the regime’s shattered legitimacy. [1] Indeed, as early as 2005, the US ambassador in 
Sanaa wrote a cable envisioning scenarios including Salih’s fall to the legal parliamentary 
opposition, plotters among his inner circle or mass popular protests. [2] No one could have 
predicted the confluence of all three. But Washington, forewarned, might better have 
hedged its bets. It has yet to do so. 
Over $1 billion in additional US military assistance already in the pipeline has been frozen in 
light of the spring’s events. Hesitant to distance itself from Salih and low on sympathy for 
the protesters, the US was upbeat about the prospects for the face-saving GCC agreement 
to be sealed by the end of April. The Embassy in Sanaa announced that it was “distressed” 
and “disturbed” by the “violence, April 27, that killed [12] and injured hundreds of Yemeni 
citizens...on the eve of signing an historic agreement…that will achieve through peaceful, 
democratic and constitutional means a transition of authority leading to new presidential 
elections in July 2011.” Its press release urged “Yemeni citizens” to show good faith by 
“avoiding all provocative demonstrations, marches and speeches in the coming days,” 
adding coyly: “We also urge government security forces to refrain from using violence 
against demonstrators.” 
The Central Players 
At center stage in the Yemeni potboiler is President ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih, barricaded in a 
fortified palace compound in the capital behind Revolutionary Guards and US-armed Special 
Forces commanded by his son and one-time heir apparent Ahmad. Peeping over the 
parapets, Salih delivers nearly nonsensical speeches in his trademark not-quite-literate 
Arabic inveighing against Zionist instigators and fornicating demonstrators. The revolt 
against his rule is coordinated from “an operations room in Tel Aviv,” he ventured on March 
1. On April 18 he denigrated the popular movement as an un-Islamic “mixing of sexes.” To 
these and other pronouncements the throngs jeer and hurl their shoes at the giant video 
screen in the plaza outside Sanaa University: In video footage of the scene, the footwear 
looks like flies buzzing around the president’s face. 
Defiant if not oblivious, Salih announced in late April 50,000 new, unfunded civil service 
jobs and vowed to relinquish power only “through the ballot box,” calling, spuriously, for 
elections monitored by international observers. “People who resign from their posts and join 
the revolutions are the symbols of corruption and they do not have agendas for reforming 
the economic, cultural, social and developmental situation in the country,” he told military 
cadets on April 25. Next, presumably enraged by Al Jazeera coverage of the 
demonstrations, he accused Qatar, one of the GCC states sponsoring the exit deal, of 
“inciting and financing chaos.” 
The partners to the proposed exit deal are the leaders of the so-called Joint Meeting Parties 
or JMP, a motley coalition of Socialists, Sunni Islamists and other conservatives affiliated 
with the party known as Islah, and partisans of Nasserist, Baathist and liberal platforms, as 
well as Islamists from the Zaydi branch of Shi‘ism practiced in (northern) Yemen. This legal, 
parliamentary opposition coalition has been bargaining with the ruling General People’s 
Congress over the rules of the suspended electoral process for several years. It includes 
prominent national figures like former South Yemeni Prime Minister Yasin Sa‘id Nu‘man, 
human rights activist and Sanaa University professor Muhammad ‘Abd al-Malik al-
Mutawakkil and Islah spokesperson ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Anisi, among others with a measure 
of “street cred.” 
Comprised of politicians from both of the two Yemeni polities that unified in 1990, this 
important group has extensive experience in Yemen’s unique National Dialogue of Popular 
Forces and in electoral and parliamentary politics. With its rotating chairmanship keeping 
any one star out of the limelight, the JMP has played a pivotal yet ambiguous role in the 
2011 political crisis, embracing the demonstrations after they were well underway, refusing 
Salih’s belated February offer to form a coalition government and now conferring with the 
GCC and other international actors to find an exit from the impasse. The JMP leaders 
accepted the deal whereby Salih would step down in return for immunity from prosecution 
for his many crimes and the promise that they would gain substantial parliamentary 
representation. 
The Plotters 
When Salih accuses his opponents of sedition, he is referring explicitly to defectors from his 
inner circle. Two were tagged by US Embassy officials who detected dissension within 
Salih’s original “triumvirate” at least as early as 2005 and again in 2009. This fact alone 
makes them worth noting. One is Gen. ‘Ali Muhsin, Salih’s henchman since 1978, head of 
the First Armored Division and the Northwest Military Command who prosecuted merciless 
campaigns that vanquished southern secessionists in 1994 and scourged Sa‘ada province in 
the far north in order finally to defeat Zaydi Houthi rebels and their tribal allies in 2010. In 
both battles, the general called upon radical Sunni jihadis to join the fight against godless 
Socialists in the south and Zaydi partisans in Sa‘ada. US Ambassador Thomas Krajeski 
described him in 2005 as a sinister arms smuggler whose name was spoken in hushed tones 
because he was feared and mistrusted by the Houthi rebels, southerners, leftists and 
others. [3] Subsequent cables revealed the rumor that he was assigned the nearly 
impossible task of fighting the Houthis in order to ruin his military reputation and thus his 
political ambitions. There is strong evidence, as well, that during its intervention in the 
conflict in 2010 the Saudi Air Force was given targeting recommendations to strike 
coordinates that turned out to be ‘Ali Muhsin’s command headquarters. [4] The general’s 
March 19 defection and deployment of tanks to protect the demonstrators from forces loyal 
to the president was thus no surprise. Subsequent skirmishes could be the harbinger of a 
civil war between factions of the military. 
In blogs, interviews and Facebook postings, pro-democracy spokespersons made it clear 
that they were not fooled by cynical turncoats jockeying for power but hardly interested in 
liberal democracy. When ‘Ali Muhsin’s troops deployed to the square outside Sanaa 
University, the demonstrators initially cringed, thinking he was coming to destroy them. 
The other power broker, who broke ranks after at least 50 peaceful protesters were 
murdered on March 18, is Hamid al-Ahmar, the most politically ambitious of the ten sons of 
the late ‘Abdallah bin Husayn al-Ahmar, paramount chief of the Hashid tribal confederation, 
long-time speaker of Parliament and stalwart of the original triumvirate backing Salih’s rule. 
Although not his Reaganesque father, as a member of Parliament, part of the Supreme 
Committee of the Islah party, a millionaire businessman and a prominent figure in the 
Hashid confederation, Hamid is able to draw large crowds in the family’s hometown of 
‘Amran. Salih is himself a Hashid. 
US embassy cables made available by WikiLeaks indicate that Hamid al-Ahmar has been 
maneuvering against Salih since soon after his father’s death in late 2007. One cable from 
August 31, 2009 quotes him calling Salih “the devil” and his son Ahmad and nephews 
“clowns.” According to the same State Department missive, he promised to organize anti-
Salih demonstrations if and when he could persuade ‘Ali Muhsin to go along and also enlist 
Saudi assistance. A second cable dated the same day put al-Ahmar among a small group of 
insiders blaming Salih for “wrong-headed policies” contributing to “Yemen’s myriad 
problems” who may be “truly concerned about the fate of Yemen, or, smelling blood in the 
water…positioning themselves for a post-Saleh era.” In April 2011, the US Embassy in 
Sanaa felt compelled to issue a terse denial of rumors of its support for Hamid al-Ahmar. 
50,000 Pairs of Clasped Hands 
State-run Sanaa television runs continuous tape of people jumping up and down, yelling 
“the people want ‘Ali ‘Abdallah Salih,” and file footage of marches celebrating his leadership. 
Yet neither he nor the dissident counter-elites can contain the unprecedented, sustained, 
spontaneous grassroots uprising of the past three months. The crowds clamoring for change 
(taghyir) are diverse, and dispersed among at least a dozen cities and towns. At the core 
are the youth, the demographic plurality between the ages of 15 and 30 who have never 
known another government leadership: university students, graduates, dropouts and 
wannabes grasping at straws of hope for a better future in the Arab world’s poorest country. 
They have turned their daily marches and sit-ins into performance art with music, dancing, 
skits, caricatures, posters, chants and collective gestures of defiance like 50,000 pairs of 
clasped hands held high. Women, most prominently the eloquent and outspoken Tawakkul 
Karman, head of the NGO Women Journalists Without Chains, have raised their voices more 
and more, in solidarity with demands for change and lately in outrage at the president’s 
sleazy innuendo directed at “ladies” who march or speak in public. The freedom struggle has 
now gone viral and virtually nationwide. 
A peaceful intifada has been in motion since the summer of 2007 in the south, the territory 
known as the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen and ruled by the Yemeni Socialist 
Party (YSP) from 1967 to 1990. In 1990, the south unified with the north, already ruled by 
Salih, and then attempted secession four years later. During the short civil war, the 
president called in assorted tribal militias and “Afghan Arabs” -- salafis returned from the 
anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan -- to assist the regular army under the command of Gen. 
‘Ali Muhsin. A beer factory and civil service administration offices in Aden were torched and 
looted, while the erstwhile southern Socialist leadership fled by boat to Oman. Northern 
military officers and gangs of scalawags installed themselves as governors, administrators 
and landowners. Men deprived of their jobs and pensions and women stripped of the rights 
enjoyed under the old Socialist administration seethed under what they regarded as 
occupation. Oil revenues from wells on what had been Southern soil flowed into the coffers 
of Salih and his cronies. After more than a decade of economic collapse and political 
repression, the youth and some of the old YSP cadres launched what became known as al-
Harak, a movement for change. [5] By late 2010, their protests had become commonplace, 
although Salih and the official media succeeded temporarily in presenting their grievances 
as secessionist gripes that would destroy Yemeni unity. On April 26, they marked the 
anniversary of the start of the 1994 civil war in which the former South attempted to 
reestablish its independent sovereignty. 
Whether or not they harbor genuinely separatist sentiments, residents of the former South 
Yemen have good reason to feel they have been punitively targeted and deprived of basic 
liberties and entitlements. 
Yet, by the same token, many southern tribulations resonate in every province of the 
republic: the grotesque enrichment of regime cronies at the expense of the many; 
deteriorating standards of living; obscenely bad schools, hospitals and roads; the 
skyrocketing price of meat, staples and even clean water; the lack of jobs for college and 
high-school graduates. Ambassador Krajeski had already seen prospects for revolt in the 
2005 riots prompted by the lifting of fuel subsidies. Then, dissatisfaction was particularly 
acute among the perennially restive tribes of the eastern provinces of al-Jawf and Ma’rib, 
where truckers and pump farmers consider cheap fuel their lifeblood. Grandiose pageants of 
presidential power, half-truths in the official media, indignities at military checkpoints, 
arbitrary arrests and imprisonments -- these and other daily insults feed popular alienation, 
despair and frustration, most notably among the youth. While a privileged few cool off in 
swimming pools in their luxury compounds, the water table has fallen, decimating the farm 
economy that remains the livelihood of the rural majority. Farmers and ranchers facing 
starvation have flocked to the cities where water supplies and social services are swamped. 
Misery has become the new normal; millions barely survive on the equivalent of a dollar or 
two per day. 
Misery Loves Company 
Without a doubt, Yemenis were inspired by the revolutionary movements in Tunisia and 
Egypt in early 2011. Gatherings in Sanaa and other cities in January, as the spirit of Tunisia 
diffused in the Arab world, were relatively restrained affairs, replete in some cases with 
folding chairs for various JMP dignitaries. [6] In February, as Egyptian President Husni 
Mubarak began to proffer concessions under the sustained pressure of the street, the timbre 
of the Yemeni rallies rose in intensity. On the evening of February 11, the date of Mubarak’s 
resignation, thousands of joyful youth converged on Sanaa’s Liberation Square. There, they 
were confronted by uniformed security forces and regime-supporting agitators armed with 
sticks. [7] 
Thus prevented from occupying the central Tahrir Square, the youths nevertheless 
eventually found their own iconic protest locale: the plaza before the gates of Sanaa 
University, which they have redubbed Taghyir Square in homage both to their core demand 
and the rhyming name of the epicenter of revolt in Cairo. The first tents were set up there 
on February 21. People who gathered in Taghyir Square echoed the slogans of Tahrir 
Square, which in turn had traveled to Egypt from Tunisia: Irhal! (Leave!) and al-sha‘b yurid 
isqat al-nizam (the people want to overthrow the regime). Salih’s men borrowed the failed 
tactics of Mubarak, sending thugs wielding batons into the crowds and rounding up known 
regime opponents. On March 18, in a pitch of fury or panic someone ordered snipers 
overlooking Taghyir Square to open fire on the assembled protesters. By the following day 
at least 50 were dead and more lay dying. In disbelief, fury and sorrow, a record 150,000 
marched in Sanaa’s biggest “day of rage” so far. Ministers, ambassadors, civil servants, 
members of Parliament and military officers including ‘Ali Muhsin declared their sympathies 
with the protesters. On March 23 a state of emergency was declared. Within a month, a tent 
city housing men and boys (and sometimes whole families) from around the country 
stretched, by some accounts, for miles along the streets leading to Sanaa University. Other 
camps were pitched in other cities and towns. 
In provincial cities, where hundreds or thousands had attended rallies, tens of thousands 
now seized public spaces. In Ta‘izz, a large commercial and industrial city in the verdant 
southern mountains of the former North Yemen, and the neighboring city of Ibb, simmering 
discontent erupted. The Ta‘izz-Ibb area, a rich agricultural zone of peasants and 
sharecroppers often called the “middle regions,” served as a bridge between the southern 
Harak and the revolutionary movement centered in Sanaa. People from Ta‘izz traveled, 
telephoned and tweeted with family and compatriots in Aden, Hadramawt, Abyan and other 
parts of the former South Yemen already in ferment. Youth and parents in Hudayda, the 
Red Sea port that is the hub of the Tihama coastal plain where Afro-Yemenis suffer the 
country’s highest rates of poverty and political disenfranchisement, filled the public square 
with banners and chants: Irhal! In mid-April protesters were shot dead by security forces in 
Ta‘izz, Hudayda and other cities, as well as in Sanaa. Each funeral -- at least 145 to date -- 
provoked more angry or grief-stricken dissenters to call for the downfall of the regime. 
Insurrectionary sentiments fueled patriotic solidarities and unifying sympathies. These 
spread to the vast plains, mountains and deserts north, northwest, east and somewhat 
south of Sanaa, in the provinces of Sa‘ada, al-Jawf, Ma’rib, ‘Amran and Dhamar. In these 
rather sparsely populated, semi-arid regions analogous to Texas or Wyoming, the so-called 
tribal heartland where ranchers, cowboys, truckers and hillbillies carry Kalashnikovs or even 
bazooka launchers and historically harbor deep mistrust of the central government, 
conventional protests were mixed with “traditional” acts of civil disobedience, such as road 
blockages and commercial stoppages. In a heavily tribal area further south, al-Bayda, men 
threw down their arms in April to march to another popular slogan: Silmiyya! (Peacefully!) 
Bear in mind: Armed tribesmen and villagers could resort to open rebellion but have elected 
to keep their powder dry. 
The Impasse 
As April moved into May, scenarios were buzzing like the shoes tossed at Salih’s visage on 
the giant screen. The accord that was supposed to be signed May 1 remained a work in 
progress up to the eleventh hour. The basic plan was for President Salih to transfer power 
to his vice president, the relatively impotent ‘Abd al-Rabb Mansour al-Hadi, within 30 days. 
Under a new power sharing arrangement, the ruling General People’s Congress would retain 
50 percent of the 301 seats in Parliament, the opposition JMP would acquire 40 percent and 
10 percent would go to independents, including, presumably, representatives of the youth 
movement. Within a week a transitional unity government expected to be lead by a JMP 
prime minister, preferably from the former South, was to be formed. Senior statesman ‘Abd 
al-Karim al-‘Iryani, the current secretary-general of the GPC, having until recently remained 
aloof from the fray, was dispatched to the Saudi Arabian capital of Riyadh to participate in 
negotiations with the GCC. Crucially, but vaguely, the proposal specified an end to the 
demonstrations. The remaining 70 loyalists in Parliament further demanded that Salih retain 
his leadership of the GPC. It was not clear if a popular opposition demand that he and family 
members resign their military posts was really part of the deal. 
The arrangement was too ambiguous and riddled with loopholes for either Salih or the 
protesters to accept by the May 1 deadline. In the end, only the GCC monarchies and the 
JMP leaders were ready to sign. Salih first offered to have either al-‘Iryani or Vice President 
al-Hadi verify the accord on his behalf in Riyadh, and then promised to sign in Sanaa in the 
presence of the GCC’s al-Zayani. At the last minute, he acquiesced to sign in his capacity as 
head of the ruling party but not as president. This refusal scuttled the negotiation. Salih 
scoffed at a basket of carrots that left him with his arsenal of sticks. 
Although Salih was the one who nixed the deal, it was clear that the GCC plan did not have 
popular backing, either. It had not been negotiated so much as cobbled together. On April 
24, a group signing itself as the Youth Popular Revolution Committee already rejected the 
provision of immunity from criminal prosecution for the president and his family, which 
could easily amount to carte blanche for excessive force during the month-long transition. 
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch shared these concerns. It was unclear, 
moreover, how the JMP could disperse the sit-ins and roadblocks; as commentator Jamila 
‘Ali Raja told Al Jazeera, the formal parties could invite their own members to abandon the 
barricades, but not give orders to the tens of thousands they do not represent. 
The failed GCC push to reach an accord by May 1 turned out to be the opening gambit in a 
complex negotiation that seems unlikely to be concluded soon. More and more, personalities 
from bygone dramas are now weighing in from exile: rebel leader Yahya al-Houthi and 
former South Yemen leaders Haydar Abu Bakr al-‘Attas, ‘Ali Salim al-Bayd and ‘Ali Nasir 
Muhammad, to name a few, seek to claim the initiative. If there is to be forward 
momentum, their views and constituencies, such as they are, will have to be taken into 
account. And yet these additions to the mix can only complicate matters. 
Yemen is now in political limbo and not far from the road to hell. No one believes that the 
president can continue in office or that he will relinquish power. The popular movement has 
come too far to back off and yet sees no clear path toward social justice. Gulf monarchies 
and the Obama administration appear to lack the diplomatic wherewithal, the strategic 
imagination or the humanitarian decency to envision a solution to the impasse. And yet 
daily the status quo becomes more untenable. Loyalist patrimonial forces are wont to shoot, 
and may yet provoke either a mutinous response or a full-fledged rebellion by armed 
citizens. The spirit of “Silmiyya,” which served Tunisians and Egyptians so well, can 
persevere only so long in the face of live fire. In March and for part of April, it was possible 
to envision an orderly transition to a civilian coalition transitional government. The month of 
May may bring more bloodshed. 
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